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INTRODUCTION

B

efore
2009,
every
American
presidential
administration had been uniform in its policy of
consistently enforcing the nation’s drug laws.
Pursuant to federal law, possession, use, or cultivation of any drug
deemed illegal by Congress was, universally, a prosecutable offense.
Notwithstanding this unwavering policy, throughout the 1990s and
early 2000s, the marijuana industry continued to grow, and several
states legalized medicinal marijuana despite the standing federal
prohibition. Moreover, President Barrack Obama, shortly after
taking office, broke precedent with his predecessors when he put
forth a policy of non-enforcement through a publicly released
memorandum authored by the then Deputy Attorney General, David
Ogden, (hereinafter Ogden Memo or Memo) “provid[ing]
clarification and guidance to federal prosecutors in states that have
enacted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana.” 1 In this
Memo, Ogden discouraged expenditure of “limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources” on “individuals whose actions are in clear
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for
the medical use of marijuana.” 2 Following the release of this Memo,
many more states have enacted legislation that would legalize
medical marijuana, and accordingly, during the Obama
administration, the medical marijuana industry has demonstrated
incredible growth. Furthermore, it is projected to continue to grow
exponentially over the next five years.
Based on this considerable increase in medical-marijuanarelated activity following the release of the Ogden Memo, it is
reasonable to conclude that much of the medical marijuana
industry’s growth can be attributed to a reliance on this Memo. In
this article, I will argue why such broad reliance lays a dangerous
path—for the states which have already legalized medical marijuana,
for the states that are in the process of legalizing medical marijuana,
for the 1.3 million people currently working in the industry, and for
1

Memorandum For Selected United States Attorneys from Deputy Attorney
General David Ogden to United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
Ogden Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandumselected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states.
2
Id.
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all who will soon join it. To make my case, I first explain why the
Ogden Memo has no real ability to constrain individual Assistant
United States Attorneys’ (AUSAs’) charging decisions, given the
difficulty of imposing internal checks on their prosecutorial
discretion, especially in this context. Next, I argue that the Ogden
Memo also lacks legal authority that can be relied upon by medical
marijuana defendants whose activities were in compliance with their
state medical marijuana laws, as has already been demonstrated by
the District of Southern California’s decision in U.S. v. Stacy 3
Further, the Memo does not restrain other federal governmental
authorities from imposing non-criminal sanctions upon individuals,
even when their behavior complies with their own state’s medical
marijuana laws. Additionally, even if the Ogden Memo has indeed
succeeded in constraining federal prosecutorial activity in this arena
to some degree, there is no reason to believe that the Memo will
continue to do so after the completion of Obama’s second term.
In the final section of this article, I turn to the very notion of
the Executive Branch’s releasing of a policy of non-enforcement of a
federal law upon an entire category of crime, such as that described
in the Ogden Memo. I argue that it is a questionable use of
prosecutorial discretion, pursuant to the Executive Branch’s lawenforcement obligation described in the United States Constitution.4
I explain my concern that, if left unchecked, the Ogden Memo will
set a precedent which allows the Executive Branch to effectively
veto any standing United States criminal law by simply deciding not
to enforce it. Ultimately, I fear that this extreme use of prosecutorial
discretion—specifically, the shirking of a Constitutional obligation
on the part of the Executive Branch and, therefore, the threatening of
Congress’s ability to create valid federal criminal law 5—could have
grave consequences for the validity of the federal government’s
3

734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079–80 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The Executive Branch] shall take care that the laws
[are] faithfully executed.”).
5
Legal positivists, such as John Austin, believe that laws require a sovereign to
impose sanctions for violations of law in order for that law to be legitimate. See
generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). See
also Robert S. Summers, On Identifying And Reconstructing A General Legal
Theory Some Thoughts Prompted By Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1014, 1035 (1984) (stating Austin’s conception of law focused on “dutyimposing rules backed by sanctions”) [hereinafter Austin].
4
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delicate balance of powers and the corresponding obligations that
flow therefrom.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the War on Drugs
President Richard Nixon officially declared a “War on
Drugs” in 1971. 6 Some would even argue that this federally-waged
“war” had begun even before that time. 7 In 1965, Congress passed
the Drug Abuse Control Amendments Act, which created the Bureau
of Drug Abuse Control within the Food and Drug Administration. 8
Then, in 1968, Lyndon Johnson established the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, later referred to as the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), which absorbed the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control
in 1973, and which was under the umbrella of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). 9
Beginning in 1969, the Drug War crossed the border into
foreign policy when efforts to limit drug smuggling from Mexico
culminated in “Operation Intercept,” which effectively resulted in a
shutdown of the Mexico-United States border. 10 On the domestic
front, President Richard Nixon had previously signed the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act into law,
which established a new categorization system for drug regulation
and thereby became the new basis for federal drug policy. 11 Most
notably for the purposes of this article, Title II of this Act,
commonly referred to as the “Controlled Substances Act” (CSA),
6

Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 435–439 (2010).
7
See id.
8
See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 286 (2010).
9
See id.
10
See Matthew S. Jenner, Note, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem
with a Domestic Solution, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 901, 912 (2011). The
operation only lasted two weeks because of the massive complications it caused,
but thereafter Mexico agreed to more aggressively attack marijuana trade. Id.
11
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§§801–971 (2006); Boldt, supra note 8, at 286.
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divides all drugs into five “schedules,” based on whether the
particular drug has a currently accepted medical use, and it imposes
restrictions accordingly. 12 The statute reflects a determination that
marijuana has no medical benefits, thereby placing it in “schedule I,”
where it remains today. 13
Nixon also created the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, whose sole purpose was
to study marijuana use and abuse in the United States. 14 Therefore,
it did not come as a huge surprise when the President declared drug
use to be “Public Enemy Number One” in June of 1971. 15
Early on in the government’s response, the DEA established
itself as the agency in the driver’s seat of the intensifying Drug War
with respect to the investigation of, and efforts to control, the
domestic drug trade. 16 As the years passed, however, public support
for the Drug War, as well as the intensity from Washington, began to
dwindle. 17
Accordingly, the aggressive anti-drug rhetoric of
previous administrations diminished significantly during the
presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. 18 However, with the
election of Ronald Regan, and, subsequently, that of George H.W.
Bush, the Drug War again gained momentum in the 1980s, as
Congress passed three key statutes, each designed with the intention
of bolstering the breadth and enforcement of the nation’s drug
laws. 19
12

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
532 U.S. 483, 491–492 (2001).
13
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971).
14
See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 14 (King
County Bar Ass’n, 2005) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL], available at
http://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/effectivedrugcontrol.pdf.
15
See Boldt, supra note 8, at 286; NPR.ORG, Special Series: The Forgotten War
on Drugs, [hereinafter Forgotten War],
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 (last visited Sept.
29, 2014).
16
Yung, supra note 6, at 437–40. Note that the DEA is also heavily involved in
enforcement on an international level. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, DEA International Training,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/Training/IntTraining.shtml (last visited Sept. 29,
2014).
17
See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 14, at 26; Yung, supra note 6, at
437–40.
18
Boldt, supra note 8, at 287.
19
Id. at 287–88.
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In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act, which added a series of new drugs to the list of previously
prohibited substances, and the Act also introduced new laws
allowing prosecutors to seize assets of alleged drug offenders (prior
to conviction). 20 Subsequently, in 1986, Congress passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act, which addressed widespread concern about crack
cocaine, by introducing mandatory minimum sentences, along with
other harsher penalties. 21 Lastly, in 1988, Congress passed the AntiDrug Abuse Act, which further increased mandatory drug penalties 22
and created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the head of
which has the unofficial title of “Drug Czar.” 23
Rhetorically, the 1980s also saw a concerted government
effort to inform the public about the dangers of drug use.
Specifically, the Regan Administration introduced the “Just Say No”
slogan, which became a national rallying cry for anti-drug
proponents. 24 In 1987, the Partnership for a Drug Free America25
released a well-known advertisement analogizing a cracked egg to a
brain under the influence of drugs, which was subsequently named
one of the top 100 best commercials of all time by TV Guide. 26
Additionally, other public and private entities joined the fight during
this era, including the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (“DARE”)
program, originally a Los Angeles-focused organization that later
became national. 27

20

See H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288.
See H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288.
22
See H.R. 5210, 100th Cong. (1988); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288.
23
Boldt, supra note 8, at 287-288; See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 14,
at 27.
24
Yung, supra note 7, at 437–40.
25
The Partnership at Drugfree.org, formerly known as the Partnership for a DrugFree America is a New York City-based non-profit organization which runs
campaigns against teenage drug and alcohol abuse in the United States. See THE
PARTNERSHIP AT DRUGFREE.ORG, http://www.drugfree.org (last visited Sept. 29,
2014).
26
See Erika Alexander, Famous fried eggs: Students debate effectiveness,
accuracy of well-known anti-drug commercial, CNN STUDENT BUREAU (Dec. 6,
2000), http://edition.cnn.com/fyi/interactive/news/brain/brain.on.drugs.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2014).
27
Yung, supra note 7, at 437–40.
21
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B. Modern Legislative and Judicial Approaches to the Marijuana
“Problem”
Throughout the entire federally-waged Drug War, spanning
from the 1960s through today, federal law has not distinguished
between medicinal and recreational uses of marijuana, as it has
consistently deemed both to be expressly forbidden. 28 In fact,
lawmakers have repeatedly refused to change marijuana’s status
under the Controlled Substances Act, a step that would allow the
substance to legally be used for medicinal purposes. 29 Perhaps even
more significantly, Congress has repeatedly rejected amendments to
appropriation bills that would prohibit the DOJ from using funds to
prevent states from implementing laws that authorize the possession,
cultivation, and use of marijuana for medical purposes. 30
Additionally, two significant Supreme Court decisions, Gonzalez v.
Raich, and U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, have indicated
that legislative regulation of marijuana is solely within the power of
the federal government, and that federal courts may not carve out
exceptions to the CSA for individuals who claim a dire medical need
for marijuana. 31
In the 2001 case Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, the Court
considered a California statute that created an exception to
California laws prohibiting the possession and cultivation of
28

See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 635 (2011).
29
See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); Vijay
Sekhon, Comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the Executive
Branch's Decision To Not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in Compliance with
State Medical Marijuana Laws, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 553, 557 n.18 (2010);
see also Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and
the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421,
1434–35 (2009) (discussing failed legislative and administrative proposals to
reschedule marijuana at the federal level).
30
See H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H.
Amdt. 272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt.
297, 108th Cong. (2003); Sekhon, supra note 29, at 557–58 n.19.
31
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005); Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop.,
532 U.S. at 486.

55

56

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 1

marijuana. 32 Specifically, the statute held that “[t]hese prohibitions
[of cultivation and possession of marijuana] no longer apply to a
patient or his primary caregiver who possesses or cultivates
marijuana for the patient's medical purposes upon the
recommendation or approval of a physician.” 33 The petitioner,
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, argued that the defense of
“medical necessity” should be read into the language of the CSA that
prohibits the cultivation or possession of marijuana. 34 The Court
disagreed, holding that it “need not decide…whether necessity can
ever be a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide
for it. To resolve the question presented in this case, [it] need only
recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds
with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act.” 35 The Court
further explained that the CSA “does not explicitly abrogate the
defense[,] [b]ut its provisions leave no doubt that the defense is
unavailable.” 36
A few years later, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the
regulation of marijuana under the CSA fell squarely within
Congress’ constitutionally-mandated Commerce Power 37 and ruled
that marijuana regulation was undoubtedly within the domain of
federal law, 38 thereby rendering it binding on the states pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 39 In Raich, despite the
fact that the respondent was indisputably growing and ingesting
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law, 40 DEA
agents seized and destroyed all of his cannabis plants. 41 In its
32

Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 486.
Id.
34
Id. at 490.
35
Id. at 491.
36
Id.
37
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power . . . [to]
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States . . . .").
38
Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
39
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
40
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
41
Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
33
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decision, the Court declared that its jurisprudence “establishes
Congress's power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.” 42 Analogizing the marijuana market to that of
wheat 43 because both have a “substantial effect on supply and
demand in the national market for that commodity,” 44 the Court also
stressed that it need not determine “whether respondents' activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in
fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.” 45
Citing the enforcement difficulties that would inevitably be involved
in distinguishing between locally and non-locally grown marijuana,
as well as concerns about diversion of locally grown marijuana, the
Court had “no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational
basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture
and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the
CSA.” 46
Despite the fact that all evidence indicates that federal
lawmakers have been, and continue to be, adamantly opposed to the
legalization of marijuana; 47 that the Supreme Court has held that no
42

See id. at 17.
The Court relied upon an earlier decision, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), where, in rejecting the appellee farmer's contention that Congress's
admitted power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not
authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for the appellee's
own consumption, the Court established that Congress can regulate purely
intrastate activity that is not itself "commercial." That is, not produced for sale if
it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (citing
317 U.S. 111, 127–128 (1942)).
44
Of course, this analogy is striking because the marijuana market as a whole is
illegal under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971. Based on this significant
difference between the situation in Wickard and the situation in Raich, it seems
that the Supreme Court could have easily distinguished the two cases. See
generally Raich, 545 U.S. at 57–59 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45
See id. at 19, 22.
46
See id. at 22. In assessing the scope of Congress ' authority under the
Commerce Clause, the court need not determine whether the regulated activities,
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce; it only must
determine whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding. Id. (citing United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
47
See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong.
43
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medical exception can be read into the CSA; 48 and that the Supreme
Court has granted Congress the sole authority to regulate marijuana
(medical or non-medical), 49 a significant (and still growing) number
of states have recently reformed their own laws to legalize medical
marijuana, beginning with California in 1996. 50 While the specifics
of these individual state laws vary, they generally permit a resident
to possess, consume, and grow marijuana by obtaining a qualifying
diagnosis and recommendation from a licensed physician. 51
C. Pre-Obama Executive Branch Response to State Legalization of
Medical Marijuana
Even prior to the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions,
federal officials vowed to come down hard on the state medical
marijuana legalization movement. 52 Specifically, in response to
California’s 1996 Compassionate Use Act, 53 President Clinton’s
“Drug Czar,” Barry McCaffrey, issued a public statement, which
outlined the steps that the federal government would take to prevent
states from legalizing medical marijuana. 54 McCaffrey stated that
suppliers would be prosecuted; various government benefits would
be denied to anyone who used marijuana pursuant to state law; and
marijuana-recommending physicians’ licenses would be revoked. 55

(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.
Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt.
272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H.Amdt. 297, 108th
Cong. (2003).
48
See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 491.
49
See Raich 545 U.S. at 19, 22.
50
Mikos, supra note 28, at 636.
51
Id.
52
See id.at 637.
53
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2014).
54
See Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (“Department of Justice's
(DOJ) position is that a practitioner's action of recommending or prescribing
Schedule I controlled substances is not consistent with the "public interest" (as that
phrase is used in the federal Controlled Substances Act) and will lead to
administrative action by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to revoke
the practitioner's registration.”).
55
See id.; Mikos, supra note 28, at 637–38.
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Regarding such revocations, Vanderbilt University School of
Law Professor Robert Mikos observed in his article, titled On the
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, that the states “seem[ed to]
anticipate this roadblock.” 56 For example, California’s medical
marijuana laws only required a physician’s recommendation for
attainment of the cannabis, as opposed to a prescription. 57 While
this specific distinction did not originally affect the DEA’s
crackdown efforts, it was eventually found to be constitutionally
significant by the Ninth Circuit in Conant v. Walters. 58 According
to this Court, a recommendation, unlike a prescription, entails no
more than simply discussing marijuana use; it does not necessarily
encourage marijuana use. 59 As a result of this statutory distinction,
in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the DEA no longer
threatens to sanction physicians for recommending marijuana. 60
The battle against state medical marijuana legalization
intensified under the administration of George W. Bush, as Assistant
United States Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile medical
marijuana suppliers during these eight years. 61 Even more at the
front lines of this administration’s crackdown was the DEA, which
conducted significant numbers of raids on medical marijuana
dispensaries in this period. 62 Through the laws enacted in the 1980s
pertaining to asset seizure, 63 the DEA also frequently commenced
forfeiture proceedings against landlords who are aware of the fact
that their tenants are growing marijuana on their property. 64
56

Mikos, supra note 30, at 1466.
Id.
58
See 309 F.3d 629, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By
speaking candidly to their patients about the potential benefits of medical
marijuana, [physicians] risk losing their license to write prescriptions, which
would prevent them from functioning as doctors.”).
59
See id. at 638.
60
See Mikos, supra note 29, at 1466–67.
61
Mikos, supra note 28, at 638 (citing Bob Egelko, Pot Advocate Gets 1 Day in
Jail and Gives Judge a Piece of His Mind, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 2007, at B3
(detailing Bush II Administration's prosecution of Ed Rosenthal, the so-called guru
of ganga)).
62
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 638 (noting that there were almost two hundred
raids on medical marijuana dispensaries in CA alone during this period).
63
See H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984).
64
Mikos, supra note 29, at 1467.
57
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Ultimately, however, these federal efforts to take down large
marijuana suppliers are unlikely to have had a significant impact on
the supply or use of marijuana as a whole, as evidence indicates that
production of medical marijuana has still surged in the past few
decades. 65 Professor Robert Mikos attributes this “fail[ure]” (at least
from the perspective of the federal government) to the lack of
“substantial barriers to entry in the marijuana market.” 66
Specifically, he explains that marijuana can be produced in any
climate; special skills are unnecessary to cultivate the plant; and
ample information regarding proper cultivation is readily available
online. 67 Due to this relative ease of production, as well as the
significant demand for the product, the sub-optimal results of any
federally initiated and sponsored crackdown on marijuana seem to
demonstrate that the federal government alone (without the help of
the states) simply lacks the resources to make a dent in this evergrowing industry, notwithstanding the field’s [at best] questionable
legality. 68
D. The Obama Administration Tries a Different Approach
In 2009, the Obama administration declared that it would
take a political 180-degree turn from the medical marijuana policies
of its predecessors, when it announced that it would cease
enforcement of the federal ban on medical marijuana. 69 This
announcement came by way of multiple individuals through multiple
vehicles, starting with the [arguably ambiguous] 70 promises made
65

See id. (citing JOHN GETTMAN, MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES
3 (2006), available
at http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport2006.pdf (estimating
that domestic marijuana production surged ten-fold between 1981 and 2006, in
spite of ongoing federal and state eradication campaigns; also concluding that
marijuana is the largest cash crop in the United States)).
66
Mikos, supra note 29, at 1467.
67
Id.
68
See discussion of Ogden Memo’s authoritative force infra Part III.
69
Mikos, supra note 29, at 633.
70
Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (“At best, these statements show that in early
2009, when former President Bush personnel still held key positions in the federal
government, the Obama administration did not anticipate that it would continue
DEA raids of medical marijuana dispensaries complying with state law.”).

60

2015

MEDICAL MARIJUANA

61

earlier by then candidate Barack Obama and concurrent statements
from his spokesmen made before the election. 71 Subsequently,
almost one year after the 2008 election, came the most significant
promulgation of the new President’s policy in a highly-publicized
memorandum to “Selected United States Attorneys” from Deputy
Attorney General David Ogden. 72 The purported purpose of the
Ogden Memo was to “provide[] uniform guidance to focus federal
investigations and prosecutions in [] States [in which medical
marijuana is legal] on core federal enforcement priorities.” 73 Citing
a commitment to “making efficient and rational use of [the DOJ’s]
limited investigatory and prosecutorial resources,” the Ogden Memo
urged federal prosecutors not to enforce the federal marijuana ban
against persons who act in “clear and unambiguous compliance”
with state medical marijuana laws. 74
At first glance, as Professor Mikos observes, the Ogden
Memo “seemingly represents a ground-breaking shift in federal drug
policy…[because] it appears to suspend the federal government’s
long-standing campaign against medical marijuana.” 75 This is the
interpretation that was embraced by the media, 76 as well as a
significant number of states and many of their residents. 77 Shortly
before the Ogden Memo was released, as of early October 2009, 12
states allowed for some form of legalized medical marijuana. 78

71

See id. at 1078.
See Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Mikos, supra note 28, at 639.
76
See id. at 639 n.34 (citing Editorial, Medical Marijuana's Merit: Obama
Administration's Policy Change Is Right Call, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 26,
2009, at A12 ("[The NEP memorandum] reverses longstanding federal policy and
marks a step toward separating those who could be helped by marijuana's
therapeutic properties from those who criminally distribute or use it."); Editorial,
Good Sense on Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A30 ("Attorney
General Eric Holder Jr. has made the right decision, calling off prosecutions of
patients who use marijuana for medical purposes or those who distribute it to them
- provided they comply with state law. It is a welcome reversal of the Bush
administration's ideologically driven campaign to prosecute dispensaries.")).
77
See discussion of state legalization and growth of industry infra Part II(D).
78
See PROCON.ORG, Historical Timeline: History of Marijuana as Medicine 2900 BC to Present,
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Following the release of the Ogden Memo, Maine immediately
legalized medical marijuana within a matter of weeks, and then
seven more states followed with legalizations by March of 2014. 79
Additionally, and perhaps more indicative of a trend, today, less than
five years after the Ogden Memo was released, several other states,
not including the aforementioned 20, currently 80 have pending
legislation which will allow for the legalization of medical
marijuana. 81
The impact of the Ogden Memo also can be measured by the
significant economic growth of the industry during this period and to
date. According to IBISWorld, an industry reporting company, the
federal government’s “signal [of] its tacit acceptance” of state action
to legalize marijuana for medical use has caused the nationwide
medical marijuana industry to grow at a rate of 13.8 percent since
2009. 82 IBISWorld projects the industry’s annual revenue to be $2
billion and estimates that over 1.3 million people across the country
are employed in the industry. 83 Of course, with the pending
legalization legislation in several additional states, one can certainly
expect those industry numbers to continue to grow. 84 Indeed, a
recent Huffington Post article cited a projected annual growth of the
“legal” marijuana market, the vast majority of which is medical, to
eclipse that of even the smartphone—formerly the fastest growing
market, based on a recent report about the growth of the marijuana
industry. 85
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000026#20052009 (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter PROCON.ORG].
79
See id. These states include: New Jersey, Arizona, Delaware, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Illinois.
80
As of September, 2014.
81
See PROCON.ORG, supra note 78.
82
See Brian Alexander, Medical Marijuana Requests Climb Sky High, Apr. 15,
2009, http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/30217044 [hereinafter Alexander]; see also
IBISWORLD.COM, Medical Marijuana Growing in the US: Market Research
Report, http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/medical-marijuana-growing.html (last
visited August 29, 2014) (medical marijuana industry currently growing at a rate
of 16.2%) [hereinafter IBISWORLD.COM].
83
IBISWORLD.COM, supra note 82.
84
See generally Alexander, supra note 82.
85
Carly Schwartz, Marijuana Market Poised To Grow Faster Than Smartphones,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 1, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/04/marijuana-market_n_4209874.html
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Steve Berg, managing director of Wells Fargo Bank and
editor of this report, the second edition of the State of Legal
Marijuana Markets, stated that cannabis is the fastest-growing
domestic industry in the nation. 86 Berg’s report credits a “seismic
shift in the public attitudes towards marijuana” for its rapid growth
in a large group of select states. 87 The report predicts that, in the
next five years, fourteen more states will legalize marijuana in some
form, and that the market will grow to $10.2 billion annually by
2018. 88
E. Resistance to the Nationwide Trend of Medical Marijuana
Legalization within the Executive Branch’s Own Department of
Justice
Unfortunately for some, a “shift” in “public attitudes towards
[medical] marijuana” 89 does not necessarily equate to federal
acceptance of this state-catalyzed trend across the three branches. In
fact, there is evidence of some form of resistance to this trend from
every branch of government: the Legislative Branch has consistently
rejected attempts at CSA reform; 90 the Supreme Court has
analogized the legal wheat market with the illegal marijuana market
to support its holding that marijuana regulation is within the federal
domain; 91 and, perhaps most surprisingly, even the Executive
(stating the smartphone market is growing at an annual rate of 7.3%) [hereinafter
Schwartz] (citing Arcview Market Research, LEGAL MARIJUANA MARKETS 2D
(2013), available at http://www.arcviewmarketresearch.com) [hereinafter Arcview
Market Research].
86
See Arcview Market Research, supra note 85.
87
Schwartz, supra note 85.
88
Id. (citing Arcview Market Research, supra note 85).
89
See Schwartz, supra note 85.
90
See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.
Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt.
272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 297, 108th
Cong. (2003).
91
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 22. This analogy has become a subject of much
debate. See generally Steven K. Balman, Supreme Court Review: Constitutional
Irony: Gonzales V. Raich, Federalism And Congressional Regulation Of Intrastate
Activities Under The Commerce Clause, 41 TULSA L. REV. 125 (2005).
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Branch’s own Drug Enforcement Agency continues to battle medical
marijuana legalization, in violation of its own department’s, i.e., the
DOJ’s, internal policy pursuant to the Ogden Memo. 92
As publicized evidence of its open resistance to the
legalization of medical marijuana and non-enforcement of medicalmarijuana crimes, four years after the release of the Ogden Memo,
the DEA released a 68-page report (hereinafter DEA Position
Report), detailing its stance against the legalization of medical
marijuana and the reasons for this position.93 In summary, the report
states that “[t]he campaign to legitimize what is called ‘medical’
marijuana is based on two propositions: first, that science views
marijuana as medicine; and second, that the DEA targets sick and
dying people using the drug. Neither proposition is true.” 94 Early in
this report, the DEA reiterates what David Ogden had stated in his
2009 memorandum, but offers a far more conservative
interpretation: “While some people have interpreted [the Ogden
Memo’s dissemination of Executive Branch marijuana enforcement
policy] to mean that the federal government has relaxed its policy on
“medical” marijuana,” the DEA Position Report explains that “this
in fact is not the case. Investigations and prosecutions of violations
of state and federal law will continue. These are the guidelines DEA
has and will continue to follow.” 95
The report then cites a far less-well-publicized letter to
former administrators of the DEA, 96 written by Attorney General
Eric Holder on October 13, 2010 in response to the administrators’
earlier letter outlining their concerns about California’s Proposition
19, 97 a ballot initiative for the legalization of marijuana. 98 The DEA

92

See Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA, Apr. 2013,
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuana_position_2011.pdf
[hereinafter DEA POSITION REPORT].
94
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
95
Id.
96
In fact, as evidence of its lack of publicity, I was unable to locate Attorney
General Holder’s letter in its entirety.
97
See Brian Montopoli, Marijuana Legalization Could Be Put to California
Voters, CBS NEWS, Dec. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/marijuana-legalization-could-be-put-to-californiavoters.
93
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Position Report informs readers that, in this letter, the Attorney
General stated:
[R]egardless of the passage of [Proposition
19] or similar legislation, the Department of
Justice will remain firmly committed to
enforcing the CSA in all states. Prosecution
of those who manufacture, distribute, or
possess any illegal drugs, including marijuana,
and the disruption of drug trafficking
organizations is a core priority of the
Department. Accordingly, we will vigorously
enforce the CSA against those individuals and
organizations that possess, manufacture, or
distribute marijuana for recreational use, even
if such activities are permitted under state
law. 99
In support of its position on medical marijuana, the DEA
Report cites over 100 sources, many of which are purported medical
98

See DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (citing a letter to the former
Administrators of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in response to their
concerns about Proposition 13 and the legalization of marijuana) (stating that the
DEA maintains that, in this letter, Holder was merely “reiterate[ing]” the DOJ’s
position on the legalization of medical marijuana); see also John Hoeffel, Holder
Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016.
In the original letter sent by “Former Administrators of the DEA” to Eric Holder,
the Former Administrators expressed their “shock[] and dismay[]” caused by
Holder’s “decision to allow the states of Colorado and Washington to legalize the
production and sale of marijuana for recreational use.” See Letter from the Former
Administrators of the Drug Enforcement Administration to the Attorney General
Holder (Sept. 9, 2013), available at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QEpTGLwKpdcJ:www.d
rugwatch.org/component/phocadownload/category/8-currentlegislation.html%3Fdownload%3D45:holderletter+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
99
See DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (citing a letter to the former
Administrators of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in response to their
concerns about Proposition 13 and the legalization of marijuana) (stating the DEA
maintains that, in this letter, Holder was merely “reiterate[ing]” the DOJ’s position
on the legalization of medical marijuana) (emphasis added).
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and scientific experts. 100 For example, the American Medical
Association has rejected proponents’ attempts to convince them to
endorse marijuana as medicine, and instead has urged that marijuana
remain as a prohibited, controlled substance; the American Cancer
Society does not advocate inhaling smoke, nor the legalization of
marijuana; the American Academy of Pediatrics believes that “[a]ny
change in the legal status of marijuana, even if limited to adults,
could affect the prevalence of use among adolescents”; the National
Multiple Sclerosis Society states that studies done to date have not
provided convincing evidence that marijuana benefits people with
MS, and thus maintains that marijuana is not a recommended
treatment; and the British Medical Association voiced extreme
concern that downgrading the criminal status of marijuana would
“mislead” the public into believing that the drug is safe, maintaining
that marijuana “has been linked to greater risk of heart disease, lung
cancer, bronchitis and emphysema,” to name a few. 101 Additionally,
the DEA report cites a wide array of evidence to support its position
on marijuana use in general, including contentions that: marijuana
use is a gateway to harder drug use; 102 marijuana growers have a
negative impact on the environment; 103 today’s marijuana is far
more “potent” than that of previous decades; 104 its use among teens
is disproportionately associated with high school dropouts; 105
marijuana is detrimental to mental health; 106 it is detrimental to
physical health; 107 and its use is also dangerous to non-users because

100

See generally id. at 1–2.
See DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 94, at 2–6; DEA, Speaking Out Against
Drug Legalization 38 (2010).
102
Id. at 37.
103
Id. at 24 (citing evidence that chemicals used by marijuana growers end up in
freshwater creeks).
104
Id. at 25–26 (citing analysis from the National Institute on Drug Abuse).
105
Id. at 28.
106
Id. at 27–29 (stating marijuana can worsen depression, and that “teens who
smoke marijuana at least once a month are three times more likely to have suicidal
thoughts than non-users”).
107
DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 94, at 32 (“In 2011, . . . there were
1,252,000 emergency department (ED) visits involving an illicit drug. Marijuana
was involved in 455,668 of these visits, second only to cocaine.”). Marijuana also
worsens breathing problems due to its high levels of toxic compounds. Id. at 33.
101
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of its proclivity for causing “delinquent behaviors” and “drugged
drivers.” 108
Additionally, all evidence of the DEA enforcement action
pertaining to marijuana possessors, cultivators, and users, is
consistent with its official stance proclaimed in the DEA Position
Report, with no evidence of curtailment following the release of the
Ogden Memo.
After California voters approved of the
Compassionate Use Act, Proposition 215, which removed state-level
criminal penalties for possession and use of marijuana by patients
with a doctor’s recommendation, 109 the DEA immediately followed
with tempestuous raids of grow houses (properties, usually located
in suburban neighborhoods, where marijuana is produced) and
dispensaries. 110 These frequent raids have continued through the
1990s and 2000s, 111 and did not show any signs of slowing down
after Obama became President.
For example, a mere week after the Ogden Memo release,
DEA agents raided a medical marijuana dispensary in San Francisco,
claiming that the establishment was in violation of state and federal
law. 112 Today, newspaper and online periodicals regularly report on
the numerous DEA raids conducted on medical marijuana
108

Id. at 39–41.
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998) ("Section
11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the
cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary
caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes
of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a
physician.").
110
See Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race:
Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673, 674–75
(2009) [hereinafter Stern & Difonzo].
111
See, e.g., Scott Glover, Morro Bay Pot Dispensary Owner Found Guilty of
Federal Charges, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-pot6-2008aug06,0,516054.story; Steve
Hymon, DEA Raids 10 Pot Shops, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at B4.; Eugene W.
Fields, Rifle-toting DEA Agents Raid Marijuana Store, ORANGE CNTY. REG., Jul.
30, 2008, available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/adams-orange-agents2109067-city-going.
112
Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 110, at 765 n.15 (citing Rachel Gordon, DEA
Raids Pot Dispensary in SF, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/DEA-raids-pot-dispensary-in-SF3167274.php) [hereinafter Gordon].
109
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businesses, even when those facilities are in compliance with state
law. 113 Further, contrary to the Agency’s assertion in its 2013
Position Report that it does not target “the sick and the dying,” 114
there is at least some evidence of DEA agents raiding farms that
supplied marijuana to hospices. 115 For instance, in 2002, “between
twenty and thirty armed agents led by officers of the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration” raided a farm that supplied medical
marijuana to a hospice in California. 116 The hospice had 250
patients, many of whom were terminally ill. 117 As the Federal Court
for the Northern District of California described:
The DEA agents forcibly entered the
premises, pointed loaded firearms at
[Respondents], forced them to the ground, and
handcuffed them . . . . [Respondents] were
then…transported to the federal courthouse in
San Jose, where they were released without
being charged . . . . DEA agents remained on
the premises for eight hours, seizing 167
marijuana plants, many of the [hospice]
members' weekly allotments of medicinal
marijuana, various documents and records,
and other items. 118

113

See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 112; Joseph Serna & Emily Alpert Reyes, DEA,
LAPD raid marijuana dispensaries, Beverly Hills homes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-marijuanadispensaries-raid-20140311,0,7956322.story#axzz2xNqEghry; Matthew Fleischer,
DEA Continues Crackdown on Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, TAKEPART, Aug.
4, 2014, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/07/29/marijuana-legalization-deastill-targeting-dispensaries.
114
See DEA Position Report, supra note 98, at 1 (“DEA targets criminals engaged
in the cultivation and trafficking of marijuana, not the sick and dying.”).
115
See Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 110, at 725–26.
116
See Cnty. of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
117
Id. at 1195.
118
Id. at 1197.
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II. ARGUMENT
A. The Problem
Twenty-one jurisdictions have passed, or are in the process of
passing, laws legalizing medical marijuana since the release of the
Ogden Memo in October 2009. 119 Moreover, the medical marijuana
industry, as measured by dollars and people employed, has grown
significantly since the release of the Memo, and it continues to grow
[perhaps even increasingly] rapidly. 120 There is no escaping the
obvious conclusion that this increase in medical-marijuana-related
activity is directly attributable to the fact that the Executive Branch
has promulgated a policy of non-prosecution of federal medical
marijuana crimes, assuming compliance with state laws, so that
medical marijuana patients and dispensaries are now comfortable
with possessing, cultivating and using marijuana, without fear of
federal criminal sanctions. 121
Given this context, it would be reasonable to presume that
much of the marijuana industry’s recent growth can be attributed to
state and individual reliance on the Ogden Memo, 122 in spite of
numerous examples of federal government resistance to the
Memo. 123 And given that an entire multi-billion dollar industry is
being made possible by way of individual state legalizations of a
federally illegal substance, pursuant primarily to one single policy
memo, 124 the obvious and important question becomes whether this
Ogden Memo carriers any legal or authoritative weight. In this
article, I will argue that the Ogden Memo utterly lacks the requisite
authoritative force to merit an entire industry’s reliance thereupon; 125
119

See Jolie Lee, Which States Have Legalized Marijuana?, USA TODAY
NETWORK, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2014/01/06/marijuana-legal-states-medical-recreational/4343199;
PROCON.ORG, supra note 79 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
120
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 82.
121
See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 560.
122
See id. (“The imprimatur of the Executive Branch with respect to medical
marijuana provides individuals with a false sense of security in relying upon
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.”).
123
See supra Part II.
124
See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
125
See discussion infra Part III.B–C.
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and furthermore that, even if the memo did have dominion right
now, it is still risky, and perhaps even dangerous, for state legislators
and individuals to rely upon it due to uncertainty regarding future
administrations’ medical marijuana policies. 126 It follows, therefore,
that states and individuals should be very apprehensive about
embracing this new “trend” as one that is here to stay. 127 Lastly, I
will argue that this unprecedented policy of non-enforcement upon
an entire category of crime is inherently unconstitutional because it
constitutes an abuse of prosecutorial discretion by way of usurping
the authority of Congress to make effective laws. 128
B. The Ogden Memo’s Promulgated Policy has no Real Authority
Over the Prosecutorial Discretion of Individual Assistant United
States Attorneys
While it is certainly possible that the Ogden Memo’s
promulgated policy regarding non-enforcement of marijuana
possessors, cultivators, and users who are in compliance with state
law has influenced some AUSAs in their prosecutorial decisions, it
certainly does not technically constrain the activities of Department
of Justice personnel. As stated earlier, there remains considerable
reason to believe that the DEA has not curtailed its vigorous
enforcement of federal marijuana law following the release of the
Ogden Memo, based on its intermittent raiding of grow houses and
dispensaries in compliance with state law, as well as the publiclyreleased DEA Position Report. 129 In light of the Ogden Memo, one
might conclude that the lack of consistency within the Department of
Justice resulting from the seemingly contradictory policies between
the DEA and the U.S. Attorney’s Office would ultimately produce a
relatively positive result for those arrested by DEA agents for
126

See discussion infra Part III.D.
See generally supra discussion Part III.A. and sources cited supra note 82.
128
See infra discussion Part III.E.; see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The
Executive Branch] shall take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed.”); U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
129
See discussion supra Part II.E.
127

70

2015

MEDICAL MARIJUANA

71

violating the federal Controlled Substances Act, 130 assuming that the
defendants were acting in compliance with state medical marijuana
law. After all, even if one is arrested, how can one be convicted of a
crime under a statute that prosecutors universally refuse to
enforce? 131
Unfortunately for this class of defendants, however, there is
ample reason to believe that the Ogden Memo imposes very little
actual restraint on individual AUSAs, who are the individuals with
the ultimate authority to decide what charges (if any) to bring in
criminal cases of federal jurisdiction. 132 In general, each AUSA is
afforded an incredible amount of discretion in every charging
decision. 133 Theoretically, there is probably a strong argument that
publicized DOJ policy should constrain the prosecutorial discretion
of AUSAs, at least to some degree. However, defendants are
typically unable to be granted relief when federal prosecutors fail to
adhere to DOJ guidelines, thereby rendering general DOJ guidelines
as de facto without legal authority. 134
For instance, the “Petite Policy” of the DOJ, 135 which
“precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution,
130

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
See Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
132
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 643; see also discussion infra Part III.E.
(discussing of limits of prosecutorial discretion).
133
See Ellen S. Podgor, Department Of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice", 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 168 (2004)
(“Prosecutors are afforded enormous discretion in a multitude of decisions.”)
[hereinafter Podger].
134
See id. at 177–86 (noting that the charging decision may be limited when an
individual’s constitutional rights are in question in the context of “vindictive” and
“selective” prosecutions); Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that
selective prosecution claims are judged according to ordinary equal protection
standards); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (finding due
process was violated when the prosecution brought a claim in retaliation for the
defendant's exercise of her legal rights); U.S. v. Brown, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1276,
1286 (N.D. Ala. 2012). Vindictive prosecution differs from selective prosecution
in that the former arises out of the severity of the charges against a defendant and
is raised after the defendant exercises a constitutional right, while selective
prosecution occurs when a person is prosecuted based on an immutable personal
characteristic—such as race or religion—or in response to some constitutionallyprotected act that a person has done prior to the criminal charge being brought
against him. Brown, 862 F. Supp. at 1285.
135
Deriving its name from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
131
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following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially
the same act(s) or transgression(s),” 136 is sometimes violated by
individual AUSAs in certain cases. 137 In her article, Department of
Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” Georgia
State University College of Law professor Ellen Podgor explains
that, “Although the government has discretion to dismiss cases when
its ‘Petite Policy’ is violated, defendants are not afforded this same
opportunity.” 138 As additional material illustrative of the notion that
defendants lack recourse when AUSAs do not adhere to internal
policy, Ms. Podgor also cites examples of prosecutors’ occasional
failure to adhere to the requirement that they must advise grand jury
witnesses that they are “targets” or “subjects” of an investigation
pursuant to DOJ guidelines. Moreover, she explains that, even in
these situations, defendants utterly lack recourse. 139
On the other hand, there are certainly alternative methods of
enforcement of, along with several mechanisms that are designed to
encourage AUSAs to follow, the promulgated DOJ policy, thereby
supporting an argument that there are perhaps some internal checks
on the prosecutorial discretion of individual AUSAs. 140 For
example, the President nominates U.S. Attorneys, who are the
136

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.031 (2003),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#92.031 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].
137
See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez, 948 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1991); U.S. v.
Robinson, 774 F.2d 261, 275 (8th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d. Cir.
1983).
138
See Podgor, supra note 133, at 179 (citing Rodriguez, 948 F.2d at 915 (finding
"[n]o error in denial of the motion, because the Petite policy is merely an internal
rule of the Justice Department"); Robinson, 774 F.2d at 275 (stating that "[e]ven a
genuine failure by the Government to follow the Petite policy does not create a
right that a defendant can invoke to bar federal prosecution"); U.S. v. Ng, 699 F.2d
at 71 (finding that the Petite policy "[i]s not a statute or regulation; nor is it
constitutionally mandated"); U.S. v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Va.
1991) (finding that the Petite policy is a DOJ internal policy); U.S. v, Bouthot, 685
F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1988) (“The Petite policy does not create any substantive
or due process rights which a criminal defendant may invoke against the
government.”).
139
Podgor, supra note 133, at 181–84.
140
I refer to these as internal checks because they come from within the Executive
Branch. By contrast, External Checks would come from the Legislative or
Judicial Branches. See discussion infra Part III.E.
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overseers of AUSAs, 141 and the President has the power to remove
any U.S. Attorney for any reason, including disregarding DOJ
policy. 142 The U.S. Attorney General can also remove, reprimand,
or suspend AUSAs; 143 “slash the budget of nonconforming
districts”; 144 and even, in some circumstances, “move to vacate
convictions that [he or] she believes to have been obtained in
violation of DOJ policy.” 145
Despite these purported internal checks on the prosecutorial
discretion of individual non-conforming AUSAs—or on nonconforming federal districts in which the AUSAs practice—they are
likely fairly ineffectual in the context of ensuring conformity with
the policy put forth in the Ogden Memo, given the inherent difficulty
of monitoring AUSA compliance therewith. 146 Because AUSAs
only technically violate the Ogden Memo’s policy when they
prosecute defendants who have complied with the medical marijuana
laws of their own state, a determination of whether an AUSA has
violated the memo’s policy requires a determination of whether a
given defendant’s marijuana-related activity was in compliance with
his or her state’s law. 147 And, as Professor Mikos explains, this
determination “proves remarkably difficult for several reasons.” 148
First, although state legislatures that have legalized
marijuana, for medical purposes or otherwise, have generally
adopted regulations detailing who may possess and use marijuana,
these legislatures have not adequately addressed how the patients are
141

28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2006); U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 136, at § 34.752.
142
See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2014) (“Each United States attorney is subject to
removal by the President.”); Parson v. U.S., 167 U.S. 324, 335 (1897); OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S.
ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008) available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0809a/chapter13.htm#200 (“It is the
President’s and the Department [of justice]’s prerogative to remove a U.S.
Attorney who they believe is not adhering to their priorities or not adequately
pursuing the types of prosecutions that the Department chooses to emphasize.”).
143
U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 136, at § 3-4.752.
144
Mikos, supra note 28, at 644.
145
Id.
146
See e.g., Podgor, supra note 133, at 180.
147
See Ogden Memo, supra note 1, at 1–2.
148
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 644.
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supposed to acquire that marijuana. 149 Alaska, for example, has
expressly banned the sale of marijuana, even to qualified patients,150
despite the fact that its laws also explicitly allow these patients to
possess, and even grow, the drug, themselves. 151 And while Alaska
clearly forbids its sale, most states permitting the possession of
marijuana have not addressed the issue of how legal marijuana
possessors are supposed to acquire the marijuana in the first place. 152
Therefore, as it may be an open question whether a given defendant
is operating under compliance with state law, 153 it follows that it is
also an open question whether a prosecution of that defendant
violates the policy put forth by the Ogden Memo. 154
Furthermore, even when states have laws on this topic, there
are two reasons why these laws might be extremely difficult to
locate for either an AUSA himself or herself and/or a DOJ
supervisor seeking to determine whether a given AUSA has
complied with the Ogden Memo. 155 First, given the changing status
of marijuana laws over the last two decades, even in individual
states, the “black letter” state law might be somewhat elusive and/or
149

See Mikos, supra note 29, at 1431–32.
See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.040(a)(3) (2012).
151
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.040(a)(3), 17.37.070 (2012).; see also
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (holding that
"possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use is constitutionally
protected"). Note, however, that current Alaska criminal code prohibits possession
of any amount of non-medical marijuana. ALASKA STAT. §§11.71.040-11.71.060
(2012); see
Jason Brandeis, The Continuing Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have A
Constitutional Right To Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes 176 n.5
(2012) (“Alaska law provides an affirmative defense for medical marijuana use
that complies with the requirements of the state medical marijuana act.”) ALASKA
STAT. § 17.37.030 states, "A patient, primary caregiver, or alternate caregiver
registered with the department under this chapter has an affirmative defense to a
criminal prosecution related to marijuana to the extent provided in AS 11.71.090."
152
See Mikos, supra note 29, at 1431–32 (“This means that qualified patients must
often resort to the black market to obtain the marijuana they are legally entitled to
possess, cultivate, and use.”). Note that Oregon, New Mexico, and California
constitute exceptions to this proposition. See id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 262B-4(F) (2007); Or. REV. STAT. § 475.304 (2013); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11362.765 (Deering 2014).
153
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 644.
154
See Ogden Memo, supra note 1, at 1–2.
155
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 644.
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very complicated. 156 Specifically, state medical marijuana laws
might consist of voter-approved referenda, state statutes, state
agency regulations, city or town local ordinances, and judicial
opinions of courts of varying authority attempting to interpret the
above. 157 Moreover, even when the laws are clear, determining
whether a given defendant has complied with a particular state law, a
necessary determination for ascertaining whether an AUSA’s
prosecution is in violation of the Ogden Memo, might be very
difficult. 158 For example, if a state law criminalizes the sale of
marijuana to anyone other than a qualified patient, and if an AUSA
is considering prosecuting the dispensary for a violation of that law,
it might be next to impossible to determine whether a given
purchaser constituted a qualified patient because states often do not
require patients to register, nor do they require patients to even
obtain a written physician’s recommendation. 159
If the DOJ is not able to adequately and accurately gauge
compliance with the Ogden Memo, it follows that the DOJ also
“cannot credibly pressure [AUSAs] to adhere to the policy.”160
Matters are further complicated by the contrasting policies on the
subject of medical marijuana within the DOJ, specifically those
which have been put forth by the DEA. 161 Further, as a practical
matter, for the reasons stated above, ascertaining compliance on the
part of individual AUSAs might very well require significant
resources from the DOJ. Ironically, therefore, an attempt to
discipline a particular AUSA for a lack of compliance with this
policy might also arguably counteract the plain language of the
Ogden Memo, if read broadly, which states: “[t]he Department is . . .
committed to making efficient . . . use of its limited investigative and
156

See id.
See id. Examples include the California Supreme Court’s invalidation of
portions of a state statute limiting the quantity of medical marijuana that patients
could possess, and lower California courts’ enjoinments of local ordinances
restricting the number and location of medical marijuana dispensaries. See id.
(citing People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 196 (Cal. 2010); Ams. for Safe Access v.
City of Los Angeles, No. BC433942 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.10, 2010)).
158
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 645.
159
See id. (citing California as an example of one of these states); see generally
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (assessing California law).
160
Mikos, supra note 28, at 645.
161
See discussion supra Part II.E.
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prosecutorial resources.” 162 A supervising AUSA’s expenditure of
time and effort trying to ascertain the actual status of a given state’s
complex medical marijuana law is not an efficient use of that
professional’s time, nor is it an efficient use of tax-payer-funded
resources.
Because the DOJ rarely disciplines individual AUSAs for
violating internal regulations, 163 and because determining whether an
AUSA actually complied with the Ogden Memo is especially
difficult in any event, 164 it follows that the Ogden Memo utterly
lacks weight with respect to curtailing federal prosecutions of
medical marijuana facilities.
A rule that utterly lacks any
enforcement mechanism, and that entirely lacks a record of
enforcement, is hardly a rule at all. 165
C. The Ogden Memo Does Not Protect Individuals in the Criminal
Adjudicatory Context, nor Does It Protect Individuals from Civil
Sanctions
As discussed in previous sections of this article, there exists
ample reason to believe that the Ogden Memo is utterly lacking in
authoritative weight with respect to its ability to constrain
prosecutorial discretion, 166 as well as its ability to constrain the
activities of the DEA. 167 Additionally, a significant amount of
evidence indicates that the Ogden Memo is also unable to serve as a
defense to criminal and civil sanctions. As Professor Mikos
162

Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
Note that the Ogden Memo probably only qualifies as an internal regulation in
the broadest definition of the phrase because general references to DOJ internal
regulations typically refer to the U.S. Attorney Guidelines found in the U.S.
Attorneys Manual. See generally U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 136.
164
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 645.
165
See generally AUSTIN, supra note 6 (stating, to be legitimate, laws must be
backed by sanctions); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39 (Yale Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1969) (discussing eight rules for making rules, including
requirements that laws must not ask the impossible, laws must be congruent
between announcement and enforcement, and laws must be clear and
understandable); discussion supra Part III.B. (stating the Ogden Memo’s policy,
insofar as it is impliedly binding on AUSA’s prosecutorial behavior, does not
adhere to these important requirements).
166
See discussion supra Part III.B.
167
See discussion supra Part II.E.
163
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explains, the memo is merely providing “guidance regarding how the
DOJ will enforce the law, not a declaration of what the law
means.” 168 While the latter, by its nature, holds the sort of binding
legal weight that can reasonably be relied upon, the former does
not. 169 Accordingly, the Federal Court for the Southern District of
California has held that “[a] reasonable belief that one will not be
prosecuted is not the same thing as a reasonable belief that one's
actions do not violate federal law.” 170 For these reasons, in this
section of my article, I argue that the Ogden Memo will not provide
a defense for people charged with violations of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), even if those people are in compliance with
their state’s medical marijuana laws. I also explain that, with the
exception of one federal agency, 171 the policy of non-prosecution in
this arena is not respected as a defense to non-criminal sanctions for
violations of federal marijuana laws either. 172
While the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel is generally
considered to be a “narrow exception to the general principle that
ignorance of the law” is no excuse for a violation thereof, 173 the
defense is probably unavailing in the context of medical marijuana
prosecutions. 174 To assert the entrapment by estoppel defense, the
defendant typically must prove the following: (1) a government
official (2) made an affirmative representation that the conduct was
legal, and (3) the defendant reasonably relied on this

168

See Mikos, supra note 28, at 642.
See United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
170
Id.
171
The US Department of Veterans Affairs released a Veterans Health
Administration directive on July 22, 2010, stating that veterans who participate in
legal state medical marijuana programs will no longer be disqualified from
"substance abuse programs, pain control programs, or other clinical programs."
VHA Directive 2010-035, Medical Marijuana (U.S.D.V.A. 2010), available at
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/VHAdirectiveJuly22.pdf.
172
See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (covering the Internal
Revenue Service, the Postal Service, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
the Department of Labor).
173
United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d 640, 642 (11th Cir. 1985).
174
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 641–42.
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representation. 175 In theory, “because the government misled the
defendant, the defense estops the government from asserting that the
advice provided was incorrect.” 176 One of the goals behind the
policy that ignorance of the law is no excuse is to encourage
potential defendants to ascertain exactly what the law is. 177
However, in light of modern criminal statutory complexity, the
Supreme Court has recognized the need for the entrapment by
estoppel defense because the rationale of disincentivizing intentional
ignorance is not furthered where a defendant has sought out and
acted upon a seemingly legitimate, but actually incorrect,
government interpretation of the law. 178
Typically, courts have held that to succeed under an
entrapment by estoppel defense, the defendant must do more than
show that the government made vague or even contradictory
statements. 179 Rather, a defendant must demonstrate that the
government affirmatively informed him that the proscribed conduct
was permissible, and that he reasonably relied on this information. 180
“A defendant's reliance is reasonable if ‘a person sincerely desirous
of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true, and
would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries.’” 181 In
Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of
picketers who were arrested for picketing in a given location, after
they proved that they had previously been given permission to picket
in that location. 182 Similarly, in United States v. Pennsylvania
Industrial Chemical Corporation, the Supreme Court held that it was
error to deny a corporate defendant the right to present evidence that
175

Madeline Stavis, Deactivating the Mousetrap: Entrapment by Estoppel as a
Defense to Federal Felon-In-Possession Charges, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 655, 659–
60 (2010); see also United States v. W. Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 312–13
(3d Cir. 1997) (describing the various circuit tests).
176
See Stavis, supra note 7, at 660.
177
See id. at 659 n.20; see also Clark v. State, 739 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987) (discussing rationales behind the rule).
178
See Stavis, supra note 175, at 659 n.20; Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192,
199–200 (1991).
179
See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959); United States v. RamirezValencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000).
180
See Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d at 1109.
181
Id. (quoting United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970)).
182
See generally 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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it had been affirmatively misled by the responsible administrative
agency into believing that the law did not apply in this situation.183
There have not, however, been any decisions in which the
entrapment by estoppel defense has been successfully applied where
a defendant relied on a disseminated prosecutorial policy of nonenforcement, as opposed to an affirmative representation of the
legality of the conduct in question.184 Accordingly, the Federal
Court for the Southern District of California has expressly
disallowed this defense for medical marijuana prosecutions within its
jurisdiction, when, in the 2010 case United States v. Stacy, the
defendant relied upon the Obama Administration’s public
announcements regarding its policy of non-enforcement for
violations of the CSA in a situation where his actions complied with
state law. 185 In Stacy, the defendant operated a medical marijuana
collective under compliance with state law for three months before
the DEA raided his dispensary and seized a significant amount of
marijuana, pursuant to federal law. 186 The DOJ brought charges
under the CSA. 187
At his trial, the defendant first pointed to statements made by
President Obama when he was a presidential candidate. 188 On
national television, candidate Obama had expressed his openness to
the notion of prescribing medical marijuana as palliative medicine,
and he indicated that he would not use Justice Department resources
to try to prosecute medical marijuana users or to circumvent state
laws regarding doctors prescribing medical marijuana. 189 The
defendant also presented evidence that a spokesman for the
candidate had stated that Obama would end the DEA raids on
medical marijuana suppliers in states with their own laws permitting
medical marijuana use. 190 In response, the Court explained that it is
not reasonable to believe that a presidential candidate is empowered
to speak for the federal government regarding the application of
183

See generally 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
See United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
185
Id. at 1083.
186
Id. at 1076.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 1077.
189
Id. at 1078.
190
Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1078.
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federal drug laws. 191 The Court further noted that the candidate’s
statements lacked specificity and did not make representations
regarding changing federal law to make the use, cultivation, and
distribution of medical marijuana legal. 192
Also put forth by the defendant were statements by Eric
Holder, speaking as Attorney General after Obama’s election,
maintaining that he would not be authorizing DEA raids of medical
marijuana dispensaries during the Obama administration; statements
by Holder that the DOJ has no plans to prosecute dispensaries that
are legal under state law; and the Ogden Memo, 193 as well as other,
somewhat more ambiguous, official statements. 194 The Court
responded by holding that:
[N]one of these statements constitute affirmative
representations that Defendant’s operation of a
medical marijuana dispensary is lawful under federal
law. At best, these statements show that in early
2009, when former President Bush personnel still
held key positions in the federal government, the
Obama administration did not anticipate that it would
continue DEA raids of medical marijuana
dispensaries complying with state law . . . . No
promise was made that the DEA would never raid
medical marijuana dispensaries claiming to operate in
compliance with state law or that individuals
operating such dispensaries would not be
prosecuted. 195
The Court further held that, “even assuming the statements at
issue could reasonably be interpreted as establishing a policy that
operators of medical marijuana dispensaries in compliance with state
law will not be prosecuted, there is still no affirmative statement that
191

Id.
Id.
193
Note, however, the Court stated that “Defendant could not have relied on this
specific memorandum because it was issued after the acts alleged in the
Indictment.” Id. at 1079.
194
Id. at 1078–79.
195
Id. at 1080.
192
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Defendant’s conduct is lawful under federal law.” 196 The Court
emphasized the importance of broad prosecutorial discretion,
explaining that a holding that the Government is estopped from
bringing a case if the prosecution, itself, contradicts prosecutorial
policy “would constitute improper judicial interference with
prosecutorial decision-making.” 197 The Court also reiterated that the
fact that an individual may not be prosecuted under a given state law
does not provide him or her with immunity under federal law. 198
Moreover, while its authority within the DOJ is questionable
at best, the Ogden Memo certainly does not bind Executive Branch
officials operating outside the purview of the DOJ. 199 In 1997—a
time when the state medical marijuana movement was still in its
early stages—the federal government reacted to state legalization of
medical marijuana by calling upon various agencies 200 to “respond”
to Arizona’s and California’s legalization of this substance for
medical usage. 201 An Example of these agency responses is the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s requirement that
public housing be denied to those who violate federal drug policy, 202
Similarly, the
regardless of compliance with state law. 203
Department of Transportation (DOT) has since made clear that the
Ogden Memo “will have no bearing on the . . . [DOT’s] regulated
drug testing program,” 204 and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives prohibits individuals who use federally
“controlled substances” from possessing firearms. 205 In his article,
196

Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
Id. at 1081.
198
Id. at 1079 n.1.
199
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 646.
200
See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997).
201
See id.
202
See 24 C.F.R. § 5.854 (2010).
203
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 647 (citing Letter from Gail Laster, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to William C. Apgar, Assistant Sec'y, Office of
Hous./Fed. Hous. Comm'r (Sept. 24, 1999)).
204
See Notice from Jim Swart, Dir., Office of Drug & Alcohol Policy &
Compliance, to Emp's of U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Oct. 22, 2009), available
at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/odapc-notice-recreational-mj.pdf.
205
See Mikos, supra note 28, at 647 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2006)). Mikos
notes that the Department of Veterans Affairs, however, announced that it would
197
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Professor Mikos observes, additionally, that marijuana dispensaries
also can be held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization statute, creating a civil cause of action against
racketeers and authorizing enforcement by private persons injured by
the racketeering activity. 206
Even moving beyond the realm of strict sanctions, a lack of
federal banking services available to medical marijuana dispensaries
due their federal prohibition, even in states in which their operation
is legal, serves to disadvantage both medical and non-medical
marijuana businesses. 207 In February, 2014, the federal government
issued “guidance” on this issue, which was perceived by many
banking institutions to be a “red light.” 208 For example, the
Colorado Bankers Association’s senior vice president, Jenifer
Waller, acknowledged that the federal government outlined “all the
risks involved of banking the marijuana industry,” and that, through
this so-called “guidance,” the federal government has “made it very
clear that financial institutions can still face criminal liability” for
becoming involved with marijuana-related businesses, even if they
are legal under state law. 209
C. What Happens to Medical Marijuana in 2017?
Notwithstanding the, at best, questionable authoritative
weight of the Ogden Memo, 210 the Obama administration is still the
most medical-marijuana-friendly administration since the beginning
of the “Drug War.” 211 Specifically, no other president has ever
no longer bar patients who use marijuana legally under state law from receiving
pain medications. Id. at 648.
206
Id. at 649–56.
207
See, e.g., Matt Ferner, Marijuana Businesses Should Have Access to Federal
Banking System: Denver City Council, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2014, 12:54
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/07/marijuanabanking_n_4555586.html.
208
Herb Weisbaum, Banks Stuck in a Tough Spot between Marijuana Money &
Federal Regulations, THE BLAZE, (Feb. 21, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2014/02/21/banks-stuck-in-a-tough-spotbetween-marijuana-money-federal-regulations.
209
Id.
210
See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
211
See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
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publicly discussed relaxing the Executive Branch’s policy toward
medical marijuana during his campaign, and no other
administration’s justice department has ever released a policy memo
discouraging its AUSAs from enforcing federal marijuana law. 212
Although reliance on the Ogden Memo cannot be a defense to
criminal charges, 213 and the Memo does not really constrain the
prosecutorial discretion of individual AUSAs, 214 the Memo probably
has influenced at least some individual AUSAs to scale back their
prosecutions in this category. 215 Moreover, as states such as
Washington and Colorado have moved to legalize recreational
marijuana, the DOJ has stated that it will be taking a “trust but
verify” approach to these new state laws, purporting to require that
the state regulatory systems in place must “not only contain robust
controls and procedures on paper,” but must also “be effective in
practice.” 216 Accordingly, the DOJ apparently reserves the right to
file a preemption lawsuit at a later date. 217
But even if, beginning tomorrow, every AUSA ceased to
prosecute medical marijuana crimes and every DEA agent ceased to
raid marijuana facilities in states in which it is legal, what would that
mean for the future? One thing we can be certain of is that the
Obama administration will not continue past year 2016. So what
would happen if, rather than upcoming administrations continuing
this more liberal trend towards medical marijuana policy, the Obama
DOJ’s policy in this area actually proves to be the most liberal of the
21st century? 218 Even Bill Clinton, in his recent democratic and
relatively liberal administration, took a hard stance toward medical
212

See id.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
214
See discussion supra Part III.B.
215
See generally Podgor, supra note 133, at 169 (“[I]nternal guidelines . . . provide
government prosecutors with guidance in making decisions. . . . [T]hey offer an
element of consistency to the decision-making process, provide education for
newcomers to the department, and can serve as a restraint on prosecutorial
discretion.”).
216
Ryan J Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington,
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuanawashington-colorado-doj_n_3837034.html.
217
Id.
218
See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
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marijuana. 219 Similarly, every earlier administration since the start
of the “War on Drugs” has adopted a relatively stern policy toward
marijuana, both medical and recreational. 220
Pursuant to federal law, subsequent U.S. administrations
would be well within their constitutional rights to take an extremely
aggressive stance toward medical marijuana, due to the fact that it is,
technically, illegal, 221 and because the [federal] “Laws of the United
States” are the “supreme law of the land.” 222 There is even a strong
argument that, assuming this federal law is not changed, 223
subsequent administrations would be constitutionally obligated to
enforce it. 224 As noted earlier in this article, the marijuana industry
has been growing at a rate of 13.8 percent since 2009, 225 and, during
the next five years, as Wells Fargo Managing Director Steve Berg
predicts, it will likely grow to $10.2 billion annually. 226 Currently,
an estimated 1.3 million people are employed in the industry
nationwide, 227 and that number, too, is likely to grow as 14 more
states are expected to legalize some form of marijuana by 2018. 228
Given these current realities, if future administrations’
medical marijuana policies diverge in a conservative direction from
those of President Obama, the results could be catastrophic for the
219

See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing prior administrations’ drug policies).
See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
221
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The Executive Branch] shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”); 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971.
222
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
223
There have been many recent examples of Congress’s indications of
unwillingness to change these laws, and I have found nothing to indicate that its
stance is likely to change in the near future. See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008);
H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999);
H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997).
224
In fact, this administration is also probably constitutionally obligated to enforce
the law as well. See discussion infra Part III.E. (discussing Executive Branch’s
obligation with respect to law enforcement).
225
IBISWORLD.COM, supra note 82.
226
Schwartz, supra note 85.
227
IBISWORLD.COM, supra note 82.
228
See Schwartz, supra note 85.
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economies of states with booming medical marijuana industries, as
well as for the individuals employed therein. 229 Since the formation
of the DEA, there have been eight presidential administrations.230
Seven of them have aggressively prosecuted marijuana-related
crimes, both medical and otherwise. 231 Only one of them has
released a memorandum discouraging one category of federal
medical marijuana prosecutions, 232 and yet, as I have shown, this
memorandum does not truly constrain prosecutorial discretion, 233
nor can its existence serve as a legal defense. 234 Meanwhile, even
during the most liberal of the past eight administrations (that of
President Obama), the DEA continues to raid medical marijuana
dispensaries, 235 and there is at least some evidence of the DOJ
continuing to prosecute them. 236
For these reasons, and based on the evidence I have
presented, I would advise state legislatures to be cautious when
deciding whether to legalize medical marijuana, and I would advise
individuals to be similarly cautious when relying on their home
states’ recently changed laws as a reason to get involved in the
marijuana industry. 237 Despite predictions of large growth based on
current trends under this administration, there truly is no knowing, or
even projecting, at this point in time, how long these trends will last.

229

See Alexander, supra note 82 (stating a significant and continued growth in the
legal marijuana industry).
230
See PRESIDENTSUSA.NET, http://www.presidentsusa.net (last visited Sept. 29,
2014).
231
See Forgotten War, supra note 15.
232
See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
233
See discussion supra Part III.B.
234
See discussion supra Part III.C.
235
See discussion supra Part II.E.
236
See Nicole Flatow, Jailed for Medical Marijuana: Five Stories of Why DOJ’s
Pot Policy Matters, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Aug. 30, 2013, 2:42 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/30/2557781/jailed-medical-marijuanastories-dojs-pot-policy-matters [hereinafter Flatow].
237
See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 555 (“[T]he imprimatur of the Executive Branch
. . . [with respect to medical marijuana] . . . provides individuals with a false sense
of security in relying upon compliance with state medical marijuana laws.”);
Flatow, supra note 236.
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D. The Policy Disseminated in the Ogden Memo Constitutes, at
Best, a Constitutionally Questionable Use of the Executive Branch’s
Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Power
The United States Constitution mandates that Congress has
the power both to regulate interstate commerce as well as to make all
laws that are necessary and proper for the execution of its own
powers, and that these laws are the supreme laws of the land (as
compared to the laws of the states). 238 In a very real sense, Congress
relied on these powers when it enacted the CSA in 1970, which
criminalized the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana under
federal law. 239 And, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court has
affirmed that this criminalization of marijuana-related activities was
within Congress’s constitutional powers, thereby leaving no doubt
that Congress had the ability to enact these laws, and that they had
binding authority on the states. 240 Moreover, the Constitution also
requires the Executive Branch to execute the laws of the United
States. 241 Therefore, given the facts that (1) the Legislative Branch
not only passed the CSA within its legitimate constitutional power,
but has also consistently resisted efforts for marijuana-related
reform; 242 (2) the Judicial Branch affirmed that criminalization of
238

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 ("The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .");
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
239
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012).
240
See discussion supra Part II.B.
241
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”).
242
See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
2233, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997).
Congress has also repeatedly rejected amendments to appropriations bills that
would prohibit the use of appropriated funds by the DEA and the DOJ to prevent
states from implementing laws that authorize the possession, cultivation, and use
of marijuana for medical purposes. H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt.
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marijuana was within Congress’s power; 243 and (3) the Executive
Branch is expressly required to execute Congress’s laws, 244 it seems
somewhat surprising that the Executive Branch’s DOJ even has the
power to release a memorandum—the Ogden Memo—announcing a
policy non-enforcement of a certain crime upon a certain class of
defendants who are found to be in violation federal law.
On the other hand, the Executive Branch does possess one
power that remains relatively unchecked by Congress or by the
Judiciary—the power of prosecutorial discretion. Under federal law,
prosecutors have exclusive discretion over the decision to prosecute,
assuming the crime in question is supported by probable cause. 245
Additionally, the prosecutor also has discretion in deciding how he
will conduct that prosecution. 246 Specifically, the prosecutor may
choose which crime, if any, to charge the defendant with; 247 when to
grant immunity; 248 whether to accept a plea bargain; 249 and whether
to dismiss charges. 250 Following these types of decisions, “no court
has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review a prosecutor's decision
to treat differently two persons who may have committed what is
precisely the same legal offense.” 251
1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt. 272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646,
109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 297, 108th Cong. (2003).
243
See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
244
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”).
245
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
246
See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law:
Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 8 (2009) [hereinafter
Krauss].
247
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (“[W]hen an act
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecutes (sic)
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.”).
248
United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 87 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A United States
Attorney's authority to grant use immunity is implied from her statutory authority
to make decisions anent prosecution . . . .”).
249
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
250
FED. R. CRIM. P. r. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss
an indictment, information, or complaint. The government may not dismiss the
prosecution during trial without the defendant's consent.”).
251
See Krauss, supra note 246, at 7 (quotation omitted).
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In the 1979 case United States v. Batchelder, the Supreme
Court explained that, while the Executive Branch has broad
prosecutorial discretion, “selectivity in the enforcement of criminal
laws is [still] subject to constitutional constraints.” 252 However,
despite these alleged constraints, this discretion is left largely
unchecked by the Judicial Branch. 253 As the Supreme Court
explained in Wayte v. United States,
This broad discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the
prosecution’s general deterrence value, the
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s
overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to undertake. 254
Indeed, the Judicial Branch seems to be in agreement that
“the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict . .
. has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive
Branch,” 255 and therefore that limiting that discretion by imposing
judicial review “would invade the traditional separation of
powers doctrine.” 256 Logic dictates, however, that with unchecked
power comes potential for abuse. 257 As Kenneth Culp Davis
252

442 U.S. 114, 115 (1979) (emphasis added).
Note, however, that the charging decision may be limited when an individual’s
constitutional rights are in question, in the context of “vindictive” and “selective”
prosecutions. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605, 608 (1985) (finding
selective prosecution claims to be judged according to ordinary equal protection
standards); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (finding a due
process violation in “vindictive” prosecution that had been brought in retaliation
for defendant's exercise of her legal rights).
254
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
255
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
256
See Krauss, supra note 246, at 10 (citing U. S. v. Greater Blouse, Skirt &
Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
253

257

Krauss, supra note 246, at 12.
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observes in his book Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry,
“[i]n our entire system of law and government, the greatest
concentrations of unnecessary discretionary power over individual
parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and
prosecutors.” 258
Ironically, the constitutional clause requiring the President to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” 259 is the clause
most-often cited to support the contention that federal prosecutors
should possess virtually unchecked discretion, pursuant to the
Constitution.260 In recent decades, however, there has been
considerable debate concerning whether the power to prosecute
should be solely within the province of the Executive Branch;
although almost all of the discussion has pertained to questions of
whether a President should be able to control decisions to prosecute
individuals within his own branch. 261 For example, following the
Watergate scandal, one Senator “rejected the idea that the
administration of justice is inherently executive, observing that there
is not one syllable in the Constitution that says that Congress cannot
make the DOJ independent of the President.” 262
258

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 222
(Greenwood Press ed. 1980).
259
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
260
See Krauss, supra note 246, at 23 (citing William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy
of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474,
484 (1989) [hereinafter Gwyn]).
261
See, e.g., Gwyn, supra note 260, at 484–85.
262
Id. (emphasis added) (quotation omitted) (“Senator Sam Ervin . . . propos[ed]
to establish the Justice Department as an independent agency . . . . Lloyd N.
Cutler agreed [with Senator Ervin] and noted that to interpret the faithful
execution clause as requiring that all federal prosecutors serve at the President's
pleasure would mean accepting as Constitutionally mandated institutional
arrangements which force us to tolerate conflicts of interest on the part of the
President, the Attorney General and their immediate assistants that we cannot and
do not tolerate in ordinary judges and lawyers. In its written evidence for the
Senate committee, a committee of the Association of the Bar of New York
concluded that the Executive is not the sole repository of law enforcement power;
rather such power resides both in the Executive and Judiciary. Similarly, Arthur
Larsen, professor of law at Duke University, stated, there is nothing inherent in the
prosecutorial function to require that it be an executive function.” (quotations
omitted) (citing Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974)).
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There has been relatively little debate, however, that has
focused on how the Executive Branch’s power to prosecute might, or
should, be checked in the context of a grand, policy-based decision
not to prosecute a certain kind of crime or a certain class of criminal,
especially when Congress has decisively indicated its legitimate
desire to make the category of behavior in question illegal. 263 In
Ponzi v. Fessenden, the Supreme Court described the Attorney
General as “the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of
the United States[,] in protection of the interests of the United States
in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences [sic], be
faithfully executed.” 264 While the Court’s language certainly
indicates that the prosecutorial function lies inherently within the
Executive Branch, both the Ponzi opinion, as well as the wording of
[what is generally referred to as] the “Take Care” clause of the
Constitution (the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed”), seem to additionally suggest that the President is
obligated to faithfully execute all United States laws. 265
Given that Congress is tasked with law-making, and that the
Executive Branch is tasked with enforcing the laws made by
Congress, it is difficult to see from where the authority for the type
of expansive prosecutorial discretion encouraged by the Ogden
Memo is derived from. 266 A blanket Executive Branch policy, such
as that described in the Ogden Memo, which has the intended
purpose and/or effect of undermining the clout of one of these very
laws of the United States, would certainly seem to fly in the face of
263

See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
2233, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see
also H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H.
Amdt. 272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt.
297, 108th Cong. (2003).
264
258 U.S. 254, 262 (1921).
265
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Ponzi, 258 U.S. at 262.
266
See Krauss, supra note 246, at 2 (arguing that “[t]he constitutional separation of
powers doctrine does not adequately account for expansive prosecutorial
discretion”). Note, however, that Krauss is referring to prosecutorial discretion in
a more narrow sense (non-impermissible differing prosecutorial decisions between
seemingly similarly situated defendants, for example); whereas I am specifically
arguing that policy-based prosecutorial discretion on the scale of the Ogden Memo
is of questionable constitutional validity pursuant to the Constitutional obligations
of the Executive Branch.
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the plain-text meaning of the “Take Care” clause of the
Constitution.267
In his comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the
Executive Branch’s Decision to not Investigate or Prosecute
Individuals in Compliance with State Medical Marijuana Laws,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission staff attorney
Vijay Sekhon argues that the Executive Branch’s obligation to
faithfully prosecute Congress’s laws constitutes the very
“constitutional constraints” on prosecutorial discretion that the
Supreme Court referred to in Batchelder. 268 Sekhon also asserts that
the Supreme Court’s rationale supporting its refusal to “check” the
Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion, articulated in Wayte, 269
would not be frustrated by judicial review of the policy put forth by
the Ogden Memo. 270 Specifically, Sekhon argues that such a judicial
review of the decision not to prosecute individuals in compliance
with state medical marijuana laws would not undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Executive Branch’s
enforcement policy, nor would it delay any enforcement proceeding
or chill law enforcement efforts, because the Executive Branch has
already publicly announced its enforcement policy in this area. 271
Furthermore, Mr. Sekhon maintains, the concerns of the Court
267

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Sekhon, supra note 30, at 558 (“If
presented with the question regarding the constitutionality of the Executive
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance with
state medical marijuana laws, there is a strong likelihood that a federal court
would call into question the Executive Branch's use of prosecutorial discretion to
bypass the legislative process and enact enforcement policy consistent with
legislation that had been proposed but rejected by Congress.”).
268
Sekhon, supra note 29, at 558. In my view, however, it is equally likely that
the Court was referring to the exceptions of selective and vindictive prosecutions.
See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating selective
prosecutions can violate the Equal Protection clause); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (stating vindictive prosecutions can violate the Due Process
clause).
269
See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 557 (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08
(“Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens
to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking (sic) to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy.”)).
270
Sekhon, supra note 29, at 559.
271
Id.
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regarding judicial review of the strengths of a particular case, as well
as a particular case’s relationship to the Executive Branch’s
enforcement plan and/or the general deterrence value of the
prosecution of a particular case, would also not be applicable in this
context. 272 Rather, the review would relate to the Executive
Branch’s general enforcement plan in this area, as opposed to the
prosecution of a particular case. 273 Ultimately, I am in agreement
with Mr. Sekhon that the policy put forth in the Ogden Memo
constitutes “a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion.” 274
In addition to consistently holding that it lacks the ability to
check the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion, 275 the
Supreme Court also has repeatedly determined that victims and
interested citizens lack the ability to check the Executive Branch’s
use of prosecutorial discretion when their personal constitutional
rights have not been directly violated. 276 In Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., the Supreme Court held that “a citizen lacks standing to contest
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” 277 The Supreme Court
has, similarly, established a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
prohibits lawsuits against the federal government in the vast majority
of circumstances. 278 As a result of this immunity, private citizens
272

Id.
Id.
274
See id.
275
See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979).
276
See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (stating it is “settled doctrine” that
“the exercise of prosecutorial discretion cannot be challenged by one who is
himself neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution”).
277
Richard D., 410 U.S. at 619. Note that a criminal defendant, by contrast, is
afforded some limited degree of recourse in the context of allegations that the
government has made their decisions to prosecute on the basis of unconstitutional
considerations. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (stating vindictive
prosecutions can violate of the Due Process Clause); Wayte, 470 U.S. at 605, 608
(stating selective prosecution can violate of the Equal Protection clause).
278
See Lee, 106 U.S. at 206–07. Congress has, however, consented to lawsuits
against the Federal Government in a limited category of circumstances. See 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Specifically through the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1948, Congress has consented to lawsuits against the Government in
“circumstances where the United States, if a Private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
273
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would not be able to attain the requisite standing to sue the
Executive Branch for its failure to enforce a provision of the
Controlled Substances Act. 279 It is worth noting, however, that
when a defendant is able to demonstrate that a Constitutionally
impermissible criterion played a significant role in the decision to
prosecute, 280 defendants may have standing to “check” specific
instances of prosecutorial discretion, 281 although they are rarely
successful. 282
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated that
members of Congress might have standing to sue the Executive
Branch for failure to enforce state medical marijuana laws. 283 In its
1939 decision Coleman v. Miller, the Court held that state senators
had standing to challenge the passage of an amendment, pursuant to
Article V of the Constitution, because senators “have a plain, direct
and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes”

occurred.” Id. In his comment, Vijay Sekhon explains that, because a private
person cannot be liable for failure to enforce law, this statute would not permit a
lawsuit by a private citizen against the Executive Branch for failure to enforce the
Controlled Substances Act with respect to individuals in compliance with state
medical marijuana laws. See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 560. Note also, as
discussed earlier, that at least one Federal Court has expressly disallowed any sort
of defense on the basis of reliance on the publicized non-prosecution policy, at
least in the criminal context. See Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Based on this
decision, it is unlikely that any sort of reliance argument would be successful in
the civil context, either. See id.
279
See Lee, 106 U.S. at 206–07; Sekhon, supra note 29, at 559.
280
Of course, prosecutions, more generally are subject to many constitutional
constraints. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No
person shall…be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Here,
however, I am discussing the charging decision, itself.
281
See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Wayte 470 U.S. at 605, 608.
282
See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct And Constitutional Remedies,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 753 (1999).
283
See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 560.
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with respect to amendments to the federal Constitution. 284 More
recently, the Supreme Court has held that members of Congress did
not have standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act 285 (giving the
President the power to cancel items in any bill) in Raines v. Byrd
because the members did not allege that they had been individually
or concretely harmed by the Act; they had not voted for a bill that
was affected by the Act; Congress's power to enact or repeal bills
was not affected; and because Congress approved the Act and was
also able to repeal it if it desired to do so. 286
Mr. Sekhon argues that, under this doctrine of legislative
standing, any United States Senator or Representative who has voted
for appropriations bills that appropriated funds to the DEA and the
DOJ for enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act is likely to
obtain standing if he or she were to challenge the Executive
Branch’s decision not to prosecute individuals in compliance with
state medical marijuana laws. 287 To support his argument, Sekhon
uses the Coleman rationale, specifically asserting that Congressional
legislators would be able to demonstrate that the effectiveness of
their votes on such appropriations bills has been nullified by the
Executive Branch’s decision to disseminate enforcement policy that
is in direct contravention to such bills.288 Further, Sekhon then
distinguishes this hypothetical situation from the facts of Raines
because, here, federal legislators could point directly to the specific
appropriations bills that they voted for and that were passed, but
were then nonetheless nullified by the change in the Executive
Branch’s enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana. 289
While Mr. Sekhon may be correct with respect to the
standing issue, I am not optimistic about a hypothetical Congress
member’s chances of success in effectively challenging the
legitimacy of the Ogden Memo, in light of the ample jurisprudence
indicating the Judiciary’s strong reluctance to make any decisions

284

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939); See Sekhon, supra note 30, at
560.
285
2 U.S.C.S. § 691 (supp. 1997).
286
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813–14, 820–30.
287
Sekhon, supra note 29, at 561.
288
Id. (citing Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438).
289
Sekhon, supra note 29, at 561.
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that might check the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion. 290
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the Court has certainly shown a
willingness to impose restraints on the Executive Branch’s
prosecutorial discretion when it feels that certain constitutional
provisions have been violated. 291 Therefore, the Court’s decision in
this matter would likely turn on whether the “Take Care” clause of
the Constitution limits the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial
discretion in a way that would restrict the branch from declaring a
blanket refusal to prosecute an entire class of violations under
federal law. 292
Regardless of its outcome, I do not think that anyone would
disagree that such a proceeding would, if brought, cause harm to the
perceived legitimacy of our federal government. Given the ample
and decisive evidence of Congress’s position that medical marijuana
should remain illegal under federal law, 293 it is certainly not out of
the realm of possibility to imagine a legislator bringing this type of
suit. That being said, the current trend in state-by-state legalization
of both medical and recreational purposes, 294 together with the
increasing public support for legalization, might serve as an effective
political deterrent to any legislator’s potential action to bring this
type of suit.
Moving further into the purely hypothetical, if the Legislative
Branch, as well as United States Citizens, are unable to trust the
Executive Branch to enforce United States laws, what does this
mean for the future of our separation of powers and the resulting

290

See e.g., Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123–24.
See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 605, 608.
Outside of the prosecutorial charging decision, courts also frequently impose many
other Constitutional restraints on law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
292
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
293
See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
2233, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see
also H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H.
Amdt. 272,109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 297,
108th Cong. (2003).
294
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 85 (stating marijuana market poised to grow
faster than smartphones).
291

95

96

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 1

obligations of the three branches? 295 Or even for the continuing
vitality of our Constitution itself?
Perhaps the Obama
administration’s policy of non-enforcement of medical marijuana
law is not catastrophic for this nation, in a practical sense, due to the
growing popularity of medical marijuana use and the consequent
burgeoning of the industry as noted. 296
Nevertheless, is there not a worry that the Ogden Memo, by
its nature, will set a precedent demonstrating that the prosecutorial
discretion of the Executive Branch can extend even to entire
categories of federally illegal activity? 297 What happens the next
time that a Presidential administration disapproves of a criminal law
that requires enforcement to remain legitimate? 298 In this situation,
without any enforcement, does the law cease to be a law at all? 299
Of course, the Executive Branch has veto power over bills before
they can become law. 300 However, if this type of policy of nonenforcement were to continue to be even tacitly sanctioned and,
indeed, become the norm, I believe that any incoming administration
would have the ability to effectively nullify any standing criminal
law, which had been previously passed by Congress and signed by a

295

See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 558 (“The separation of powers in the Federal
Constitution, which grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
and make all laws that are necessary and proper for the execution of Congress'
powers and makes the Executive Branch responsible for executing the laws of the
United States, has a strong likelihood of being one of the additional ‘constitutional
constraints’ on the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch.”).
296
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 82.
297
See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
298
See generally AUSTIN, supra note 5 (stating, to be legitimate, laws must be
backed by sanctions). Furthermore, deterrence logically requires a threat of
sanctions in order to be a legitimate rationale to support criminal laws. See Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94
GEO. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2005) (noting that, in the rationales behind contemporary
criminal law, deterrence is one of the two that dominate presently).
299
See generally AUSTIN, supra note 5.
300
See U.S. CONST. art, I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If he approve [such legislation] he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall
have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it.”). Note however, that this power can be overridden by a
two-thirds majority in the House. See id.
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previous President, through just such a policy, and resulting practice,
of non-enforcement. 301
III. CONCLUSION
Both as concept and as a reality, the Ogden Memo is bad
policy. As I have demonstrated in this article, the memo has the
potential to lull states and those in the medical marijuana industry
into a false sense of security regarding their chances of being
prosecuted, both because it is unable to truly constrain the activities
of DOJ personnel, and because it is utterly unclear if subsequent
administrations will discourage enforcement in a similar fashion.
Further, the very notion of an administration promulgating a policy
of non-enforcement over an entire class of criminal behavior is, at
best, a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion. At worst, if this
broad prosecutorial authority is left unchecked, it could set the
precedent of providing future Presidential administrations with
ultimate retrospective veto power over any or all federal criminal
laws.

301

See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1.
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